As the Yemen-based Houthi rebels have risen after the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel to pose a serious threat to Red Sea merchant-shipping traffic, one is reminded of the American strategist Alfred Mahan’s declaration that “the necessity of a navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs, therefore, from the existence of a peaceful shipping, and disappears with it…” The doughty Admiral was emphasising the paramount importance of foreign trade and commerce, as well as access to natural resources, for national prosperity and reminding us that navies were only a means to this end.
Shipping remains the cheapest and most efficient method of transporting goods over long distances, and thus forms the lifeblood of the global economy. The waters of the Indian Ocean see nearly 1,00,000 merchantmen, in transit, annually, carrying 80 per cent of the world’s oil and 10 trillion tons of cargo to Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas. Amidst this mass of international shipping, there is the minuscule Indian merchant fleet of about 500 vessels, and approximately 1.5 lakh Indian sailors serving on foreign-flagged ships.
The maintenance of “good order” at sea is, therefore, not just essential in India’s own interest, but also an international commitment. The commendable alacrity shown by the Indian Navy in responding to emergent situations in the Red Sea has been in keeping with its self-assigned role of “preferred security partner” in the region.
Trade warfare or waging war on seaborne commerce has historically been a favoured strategy to coerce an adversary by striking at the very roots of his security and prosperity. Both the 20th century global conflicts saw Germany targeting Allied merchant shipping in a deadly submarine campaign that nearly brought Britain to its knees. The eight-year long Iran-Iraq conflict of the 1980s, too, saw the waging of a “tanker war” in which both belligerents attacked merchant ships in the Persian Gulf in order to impact each other’s trade and to influence the international community. Nearly 500 ships, flying 40 different flags, were damaged before UN intervention halted the attacks.
The Indian Ocean is bounded by a number of narrow passages dubbed as “choke points”. These constrict shipping traffic, making it vulnerable to interdiction by states as well as by pirates and terrorists. Among the more critical choke-points are — in the east, the Malacca Strait which opens out into the Pacific Ocean, and to the west, the Hormuz Strait at the entrance of the Persian Gulf and the Bab al Mandab Strait at the mouth of the Red Sea, linking the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea, via the Suez Canal. It is the latter location where the Iran-backed Houthi rebels have chosen to launch a spate of missile and drone attacks on US Navy units and merchant shipping. Merchantmen seeking a safe passage from Europe to the Indian Ocean will have to go around the Cape of Good Hope, adding to time, fuel and insurance costs.
Given the extreme complexity of the ongoing Yemini civil war, the underlying reasons for these attacks could be manifold. The conflict between the Republic of Yemen and the Houthis is seen as a Saudi Arabia-Iran proxy clash, which has assumed “multilateral” dimensions, with countries like Jordan, UAE, Qatar, Sudan, Bahrain and organisations like Al Qaeda and Hezbollah either participating or supporting one or the other side. The US, too, has involved itself by carrying out targeted killings in Yemen via drone attacks. However, unlike the Somali pirates who hijack ships and take hostages as a business proposition for ransom money, the Houthi group, also known as Ansar Allah, claims ideological objectives. Their stated aim for attacking shipping is to pressurise Israel to end its three-month long, indiscriminate bombardment of Gaza, which is inflicting heavy casualties among innocent civilians.
The Houthis claim to be targeting only those ships which are either flying the Israeli flag or are bound to and from Israeli ports, or are in any way “linked” to Israel. Since the number of merchant vessels falling into these categories would be relatively small, they could have been re-routed to avoid the Red Sea, thereby saving the rest of the world a lot of expense and bother. However, there is no guarantee that the Houthis will either keep their word or be able to discriminate between those that are “Israeli-linked” and other shipping.
The US, bound by its deep ties to Israel, has launched operation “Prosperity Guardian” with the ostensible aim of safeguarding Red Sea shipping. However, it was possibly seen as unnecessarily provocative and escalatory vis-à-vis Iran, and therefore snubbed by three important NATO countries — France, Italy and Spain. India’s current deployment of four to five warships on the scene as a show of “naval presence” is appropriate for its status as a maritime power and will send out a message of reassurance to the region. The captains of our warships will, however, be constrained by two factors.
First, it is the “flag state”, that is, the state in which a ship is registered which exercises exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying its flag. This means that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of security and law enforcement on ships in international waters falls on the flag state. A warship of any other state wanting to board a merchant vessel in peacetime, for any reason, will need consent of the flag state or the ship’s master.
Second, drone warfare as well as the challenges of counter-drone warfare have taken many countries and militaries by surprise. While merchant ships are totally defenceless, even navies are struggling to evolve counter-measures. Whereas larger drones can be detected by radar and targeted, it is the smaller, low-flying drones, which are hard to spot and target. The primary counter against drones would be soft-kill measures which jam or corrupt the radio signals crucial for its control and navigation. As a last resort, kinetic systems can attempt the tricky task of engaging the small drone with missiles or rapid-firing guns.
Under these circumstances, India must use its good standing with Iran, as well as with Israel, to urge moderation and restraint, lest the west Asian conflagration spreads and sets the Indian Ocean alight.
The writer is a retired chief of naval staff